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In September 1999, South Africa’s first public-public partnership (PUP) for water service delivery was signed in Odi district, North West province. The PUP brought together parastatal Rand Water Board, the municipalities of Winterveld, Mabopane and a number of peri-urban 
areas under the Eastern District Councils. Under the agreement, Rand 
Water Board was to assist in building the capacity of the local authorities 
to operate and maintain the water service system.  The duration of the 
partnership was to be three years, after which the municipalities were to 
take full responsibility for the system. 
Support for the PUP extended far beyond the signatories. The South 
African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) played an important role 
by bringing together its members and community structures to back the 
partnership. For SAMWU the PUP was seen as a model which would 
improve service delivery to historically disadvantaged communities while 
guaranteeing jobs for municipal workers. As SAMWU National Water Co-
ordinator, Lance Veotte expressed at the time, the PUP “fits perfectly with 
our vision of building the capacity of disadvantaged municipalities so that 
they can deliver good quality, affordable services to the people instead of 
throwing in the towel to a multinational company.” 
Hopes for the success of this initiative were buoyed by promises of 
financial support from various spheres of government. According to the 
agreement, each of the municipalities was to contribute 20% of their equi-
table share grant to the project. The municipalities’ stipend was intended to 
subsidise payment for citizens who were declared “indigent” and therefore 
unable to afford payment for water. The Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) also added to the funding of the PUP with R42 million 
spread over three years to help make up for deficiencies in a system where 





Poised to Succeed or Set Up to Fail?
In late 1999 there was great optimism amongst all stakeholders that Odi 
would set a precedent for supplying effective water service to underdevel-
oped areas in South Africa. With little industry and an average household 
income of around R1 750, there was little opportunity for extensive cost 
recovery and cross subsidisation in Odi. Yet, the intent of the PUP was 
that with reasonable levels of payment and an improved infrastructure a 
financially sustainable system could be established in three years.
While payment rates in the townships of Mabopane and Winterveld 
have been adequate, in the peri urban areas only 2-4% of households 
are paid up. In some areas this has resulted in cutoffs and threats of 
legal action. In Klipgat, the entire community only receives water every 
other day as Odi Retail, Rand Water Board’s local outlet, pressures for 
cost recovery.  To make matters worse, a ‘culture of non-payment’ has 
developed at the top - amongst local government officials. Contrary to their 
promises, the local authorities have not added a cent of their equitable 
share money to the coffers of the PUP. Moreover, they have failed to set 
up an indigent policy. 
Apart from the municipalities failing to honour their commitment, 
DWAF has also pulled back from its earlier enthusiastic support for the 
venture. High level authorities in the Department have all but declared 
the PUP an exercise that goes against the future direction of water service 
delivery: increased participation by the private sector. The Department 
as well as Rand Water Board and SAMWU acknowledge that a capital 
investment of R20-30 million is needed to bring the infrastructure in Odi 
up to an acceptable standard. With this injection, partners in the PUP argue 
that the project could succeed. But no such investment is forthcoming from 
national government and there is little prospect of a viable loan coming 
from sources such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa.  At the end 
of 2000, the partnership stands on the brink of collapse. Odi Retail’s arrears 
for bulk water payment stand at roughly R14 million. As Rand Water 
Board’s Sam Shabalala observes, the failure to properly finance the project 
“ is threatening to make all of our hard work come to naught.”
All in all, the precarious state of the Odi PUP raises the issue of whether 
the partnership has been ‘set up to fail’. For Rand Water and SAMWU, as 
well as advocates for the welfare of poor communities, a failure of Odi 
would be a blow to the notion of public sector delivery and free service 
‘lifelines’ for the poor. 
Introduction
The signing of the agreement is the beginning of the real struggle.
Tom Ngobeni, Deputy General Secretary, Samwu 1
If those people themselves cannot pay for water supply, we’re in 
trouble as a country.
Rowen Duvel, Rand Water Board
Governments should keep out of the water business, except as 
regulators and protectors of the environment. 
United Nations World Commission for Water Report, 2000
Odi district in North West province is known for two things. Firstly, it is the site of two monuments to apartheid architec-ture: the Morula Sun casino (poor cousin of the infamous Sun City) and the concrete behemoth known as Odi Stadium 
which has hosted South Africa’s finest football clubs over the years. Sec-
ondly, certain parts of the district were targets for extensive forced removals 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The attempt to create an exclusively Tswana 
community in Odi led to the deportation of 25 000 people from Winterveld 
to the former Kwa-Ndebele. At the other end of the process was the forced 
influx to the district. Mabopane’s population increased nearly fivefold 
between 1970 and 1976 as the apartheid regime systematically rid Pretoria 
of ‘Africans’. 
Thankfully the days of forced removals have passed.  Odi has now 
achieved renown for more positive events. For in September, 1999, Odi 
reached a milestone in the history of South African water service. Some 
of the municipalities which make up Odi – Winterveld, Mabopane and 
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partnership for water service delivery. Ga-Rankuwa, also part of Odi, 
added their name to a similar pact in July of 2000. 
This public-public partnership (or PUP) binds parastatal bulk water 
provider Rand Water Board to build the capacity of the municipalities to 
maintain and operate the service delivery system. Through a process of 
training and participatory development the PUP is supposed to provide a 
model for bypassing the private sector option known generally as public-
private partnerships or PPPs. The aim is to help build the sort of develop-
mental local government which to date has been largely confined to policy 
documents and conference resolutions. 
This report is an assessment of the Odi PUP after approximately one 
year of operation. The report begins with a brief overview of methodology, 
followed by a background of the area, the rationale for the PUP, the context 
of the PUP, and its consolidation.  The paper concludes with an overview 
of the outcomes of the PUP to date and a critical analysis of its successes 
and failures.  
Methodology
The case study began by establishing a close working relationship with the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) local in Odi. This was seen as central for several reasons. Firstly, the views of workers on the process of municipal restructuring and 
service delivery have largely been ignored by researchers. Most focus has 
been on policy processes and quantitative analysis of delivery. Hence, 
adding “workers’ voices” to the research was seen as crucial. 2 
A series of semi-structured interviews were then undertaken with stake-
holders in the Odi PUP. This involved two extended visits to Odi, one in 
July and one in October of 2000.  The union organiser, Piet Hlongwane, 
organised the interviews during the July visit and accompanied the author 
throughout the first visit. The interviews covered community leaders, local 
government officials and management from Rand Water Board. The content 
of these semi-structured interviews centred on the overall assessment of the 
partnership, suggestions for improvements, and analysis of the potential for 
replication of the PUP in other municipalities. 
Between fieldwork visits a number of telephonic interviews were 
conducted with government officials, Rand Water Board authorities and 
Samwu leaders. Overall, the selection of people to be interviewed was 
intended to include all major social groups involved in the PUP. A com-
plete list of people interviewed appears in the references section of this 
paper. 
Background
“The history of water in South Africa cannot be separated from the 
history of the country as a whole.”
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1995 (Quoted in RDSN 2000,1)
During the years of apartheid rule, South African water service delivery mirrored much of the socio-economic structure of society as a whole. Historically white areas generally had world-class service, piped water into their houses and water-
borne sanitation. Through enormous government subsidies for infrastruc-
ture white residential areas as well as white-owned farms and businesses 
were able to access water in quantities deemed appropriate to maintain 
their lifestyle and profit margins. 
Historically black areas on the other hand were subject to the vagaries 
of apartheid policy makers. In some urban townships taps inside houses 
were the rule. In others, communal standpipes became the norm. In rural 
areas infrastructure was far more minimal, such that by the time of the 
1994 elections some 12 million South Africans were without access to 
clean water and 21 million did not have adequate sanitation (ANC 1994, 
28).  The unevenness of water service was a reflection of the country’s 
gender as well as racial inequalities. For a variety of reasons, in most rural 
and many urban black households, water delivery was and continues to be 
seen as “women’s work.” In the absence of domestic connections or yard 
taps, women are generally tasked with finding alternative sources. In the 
driest parts of the country, fetching even a minimal amount of water for a 
household may involve several hours per day of labour (Hemson, 2000).  
Time spent accessing water, when added to other tasks of social repro-
duction generally left in the hands of women, imposes a nightmarish 
flexible labour regime on female household members. But water has 
other gendered linkages to the development process as well. For example, 
access to clean water contributes to the general health and productivity 
of people in the household, thus indirectly reducing domestic labour 
in the care-giving sphere. Hence the upgrading and extension of water 
services, though often not overtly acknowledged, was essential to creating 
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also an important measure to advance gender justice.
To the government’s credit, the centrality of water in the development 
process was repeatedly acknowledged. Throughout the first five years of 
ANC rule, perhaps no initiative undertaken by government received more 
public attention than the extension of water service provision. By 1999, 
although the problem was far from solved, the government claimed major 
advances. At the time of the second democratic elections, the Government 
Communication and Information Services (GCIS 1999) claimed that some 
three million households had been provided access to water since 1994.  
Most reportedly had at least at an RDP locational standard of a standpipe 
within 200 metres of their residence. At face value, this was an enormous 
step toward laying a foundation of development in previously underdevel-
oped areas, as well as a relief of the gendered burden of ‘fetching water’ 
for millions of women. 
However, while acknowledging government’s proactivity on the water 
issue, the quantitative assessments and development orientation have come 
under closer scrutiny in the last two years. With regard to statistics, several 
observers, including people from within government have acknowledged 
that the claims of three million households serviced do not reflect the 
entire reality. While the government may have laid enough infrastructure 
to service three million households, a number of studies have concluded 
that a large number of these schemes are not operational (Wellman 1999). 
In many instances the actual infrastructure has been damaged and repairs 
have not been forthcoming. In other cases, households have lost access to 
water because of non-payment. 
The issue of service cutoffs raises another important shift in govern-
ment’s approach to water service. In 1994, the Reconstruction and Devel-
opment Programme (ANC 1994, 29), in line with the Constitution, declared 
that access to water was a basic right and set a concrete minimum 
standard: in the short-term a free lifeline of 25-30 litres per person per 
day within 200 metres of the residence, in the medium term a lifeline of 
50-60 litres per person per day.  Although short and medium-term were not 
specifically defined, the notion of a free lifeline was fundamental.
This lifeline approach informed subsequent legislation, such as the 
Water Services Act of 1997. However, despite the dominance of lifeline 
tariffs in formal policy, over the course of their time in office, Ministry 
and Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) officials increasingly 
began to see water as a commodity rather than as a right. Researcher Patrick 
Bond (2000a) has attributed this shift to increasing influence of the World 
Bank over South African social policy.  Regardless of the source of the shift, 
the implications for the nation’s water services have been unmistakable.  
Increasing commodification has meant that the water policy paradigm 
has moved from socio-economic rights to consumer rights. In other words, 
a move from an inalienable right to water to a position where people get 
what they can afford. Predictably, this shift toward the commodification 
of water has been accompanied by a move toward further involvement of 
the private sector in water service delivery. Water is increasingly becoming 
‘ring fenced’, meaning that its budget is cutoff from outside cash injections 
such as cross subsidies.  Ring fencing also means that water becomes 
another good in the consumer basket which must be paid for in full, rather 
than a service which is fundamental to meeting peoples’ basic needs and 
rights as citizens. 
Increasing privatisation and commodification of water has been con-
tested directly and indirectly by a number of organisations and social 
movements. In a number of communities such as Naboomspruit, Umlazi, 
and Chatsworth, demonstrations against cutoffs have been held. A resident 
of Chatsworth in Durban, Christine Manqele responded to having her water 
cut off by going to court to seek a legal sanction for her right to a minimum 
lifeline. 3
But the most fervent opposition to privatisation of water has come 
from the South African Municipal Workers Union (Samwu). Since 1997 
the union has pursued an active anti-privatisation campaign. Perhaps the 
most publicised of their actions was the struggle against the contracting 
out of water services to British transnational Biwater in Nelspruit. Although 
the union lost the Nelspruit battle, Samwu garnered international sympathy 
from unions, trade secretariats and development activists for its opposition 
to Biwater.
The shift in water discourse and the implementation of the pro-business 
macroeconomic framework, Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(better known as GEAR) have put opponents of privatisation on their 
back foot. The most common question posed to Samwu and other anti-
privatisation campaigners became: “What is your alternative?”.
Until September, 1999 the union and their allies had little to offer in 
the way of alternatives.  They could refer to international examples of 
successful public sector delivery, or provide a conceptual framework of 
an alternative, but there was nothing concrete to point to in South Africa.  
With the signing of the public-public partnership in Odi, a living model of 
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Odi: Demography and History
Odi District is a magisterial district of some half a million people. Up until the overthrow of Lucas Mangope in 1994, Odi was part of the former ‘Bantustan’ of Bophuthatswana. Like most former apartheid-era homeland areas, Odi has a 
history of being systematically underdeveloped. Industrial activity is mini-
mal, infrastructure for basic needs such as water is unevenly distributed 
and generally of a low standard. 
Unemployment rates are high; more than 50% in some parts. Average 
household income is estimated at R1 760 per month. 4  A large number 
of the formally employed work in the manufacturing industries in Pretoria. 
These workers, most of whom are men, either commute daily or have tem-
porary accommodation in Pretoria. Moreover, limited female job opportu-
nities mean that households and in particular women in those households 
engage in a range of livelihood strategies. A number of these strategies 
particularly agriculture or child minding, are water intensive. Hence, water 
service is central to the social reproduction and economic life of the 
community. 
Geographically Odi is comprised of four types of areas, with varying 
water services. The areas are as follows:
• Two urban townships, Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa. These town-
 ships contain about 22 000 older formal houses, which are owned 
 by the council and have metred water service either inside or in 
 the yard.
• Winterveld, a formal township, much of which is peri-urban in its 
 structure. Winterveld covers nearly a third of the land area of Odi. 
 Here plots are typically large often with subdivisions and tenants. 
 The estimated population of Winterveld is about 250 000 but an 
 accurate census is difficult due to the fluid nature of the community. 
 As home to a large number of immigrants from Mozambique, 
 Zambia, Zimbabwe and other neighbouring states, Winterveld is 
 often used as a stopoff point for various purposes  (Simone 1998).  
 The somewhat transient nature of the population is reflected in the 
 water service as there are far fewer legal or metred water connec-
 tions in Winterveld than in Mabopane or Ga-Rankuwa. Many house
 holds rely on communal standpipes or buying from water vendors. 
• Peri-urban areas like Hebron, Klipgat, Kgabalatsane and part of 
 Itsoseng. These cover about 12 000 formal stands. Formal water ser-
 vice here is primarily through communal standpipes built to the 
 standard of the Bophuthatswana government – i.e. within 500 m 
 of the residence. However, because of the inadequacy of communal 
 standpipes the majority of households have illegal connections. 
• Rural villages, often called the Bapo Villages which are near the 
 province’s platinum mines. Water service standards are very low 
 here. Supply is intermittent and house connections are rare. During 
 the apartheid years, people in these villages were not billed for 
 water. 
An overall water profile of the district reveals that by September of 1999 
only about 30 000 out of the 110 000 households in Odi had inside taps. 
Another 20 000-30 000 had ‘unauthorised connections’  (UACs) fitted by 
‘midnight plumbers’. Such illegal connections were scant in Mangope’s 
day. Offenders were arrested. But since the overthrow of the homeland 
government, UACs have been the path of least resistance to water service 
for a large number of Odi households. Pressure to gain access to water has 
been exacerbated by the promises of democracy and the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme.  In a sense, water access was seen as an 
entitlement by citizens of the new democracy. Many citizens did not wait 
for government delivery. They opted for ‘self-service’: getting water via  
illegal connections or ‘pinky-pinkies’ as they are called in Odi. 
The UACs presented a financial problem for Rand Water Board, which 
had taken over delivery from North West Water Services Authority in 1995. 
In addition to representing foregone income, the poor quality of these 
illegal connections often led to serious leaks. In some cases as much as 
50% of total water was simply flowing out of the system into the ground 
(Louw, interview).
Through a lengthy political process which will be described in more 
detail below, Odi chose a public-public partnership to address these 
problems. The centrality of this initiative to the partners involved was 
expressed succinctly by Samwu Deputy General Secretary Tom Ngobeni 
in an address to a union educators workshop in October, 1999: “If this 
one fails, there is no way we are going to be given a hearing by anyone 
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The Rationale for the PUP
By the late 1990s the water service delivery system in Odi was unsustainable. The PUP was intended to contribute to solving this problem on several levels. First, in an area where water service was linked to the homeland regime, a partnership was 
envisioned as a vehicle to bring political legitimacy to the service provider.
Second, the expectation was that once a politically legitimate structure 
was in place, cost recovery would be possible. Once cost recovery was in 
place, funding would help bring the illegal connections into a metred system 
and to extend the infrastructure to underserviced or non-serviced areas.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the PUP was to provide a model 
of how different spheres of government could work together to enhance the 
capacity of the public sector. Ultimately the vision was that a public-public 
partnership could create a system of water service delivery which exceeded 
RDP standards and would be financially sustainable without external sub-
sidy. Reaching such a goal in Odi was seen as crucial to establishing 
the reputation of the South African public sector as an efficient, effective 
provider. The hope amongst key  partners in the PUP such as Rand Water 
Board and Samwu was that Odi would be the first in a long line of such 
initiatives and ultimately help sound the death knell for increased private 
sector involvement in water service delivery. 
The Context of the PUP: Local 
Government and Service Delivery
In promoting the public sector, the Odi initiative went against the grain. While the December 1998 South African Local Government Associa-tion (Salga) agreement with Samwu put forward the public sector as the “preferred option” other global and national trends increasingly 
enhance the status of the private sector. 
Within South Africa, two key government initiatives have paved the way 
for private sector involvement in service provision. The most important of 
these was GEAR. Since its inception in 1996 GEAR has promoted a market 
approach to economic policy—fiscal discipline, a lean state, deregulation, 
and privatisation. For public sector advocates, GEAR’s privileging of reduc-
ing budget deficits as opposed to guaranteeing service delivery has led 
to an 85% real reduction in the intergovernmental grant from national to 
other spheres of government since 1991 (Bond 2000b, 1) 
The fiscal austerity inherent in GEAR has been buttressed by a second 
initiative: the Local Government Transition Act. Section 10G of this legisla-
tion declares that the Minister of Finance may determine “maximum expen-
diture limits …in so far as it may be essential for the pursuit of national 
economic policy” (RSA 1993).  Such intervention by the Minister of Finance 
has come to be known as “budget capping” whereby each year a maximum 
allowable increase on any individual budget line is fixed by the Minister. 
GEAR and the LGTA do coexist with a number of government measures 
which promote a more developmental approach. For example, both the 
RDP and the Water Services Act put forward the notion of lifeline tariffs 
for services. Yet redistributive policies can potentially end up as window 
dressing if resource allocation follow the dictates of the market. 
Hence, municipalities have had to do more with less. Such a task is an 
enormous challenge at the best of times, but with transitional structures, 
new councillors with little local government experience, and old regime 
officials who are often hostile to change, this is hardly the best of times.
Consolidating the PUP
Not long after taking over responsibility for bulk delivery to Odi, the Rand Water Board proposed setting up a Section 21 company in Odi. This likely would have led to privatisation of the maintenance and service operation. Samwu opposed 
such a move and began negotiating the issue with Rand Water. Rowen 
Duvel of Rand Water Board credits the union with turning the service 
delivery model around: “We abandoned the Section 21 company because 
of the opposition from Samwu and because they convinced us to do it 
in a different way.”
The “different way” meant creating structures and processes with politi-
cal legitimacy and capacitating the municipality. During 1997 and 1998 
both Samwu and Rand Water Board devoted considerable energy to win-
ning communities over to supporting the project. The obstacles were 
considerable.  Rand Water Board legal officer Jo-Anne Ferreira noted that 
“people never associated water delivery with local government.”  
Sam Shabalala, Business Transformation Officer for the Rand Water 
Board spent considerable time talking to communities about the initiative. 
In the end, each village or community elected their own project steering 
committees (PSCs). These structures were to be the voice of the community. 
They were to deal with issues like upgrading the system, illegal connec-
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Although ultimately only Rand Water Board and the Municipalities 
would sign the agreement, there was widespread support for the partner-
ship from other important sources. These included the provincial Depart-
ment of Local Government and Housing which, according to Deputy 
Director Ben Ntoane, viewed assisting in the capacity building of local 
authorities as part of their political responsibility during the transition. 
Further enthusiasm for the PUP and the success of these structures was 
evidenced in revenue increases once the structures were in place. From 
April 1998 to September 1999 monthly collections rose from R500 000 to 
more than R2 million. Pressure to pay included cutting off service, which 
Shabalala said could be done legitimately with “credible input from the 
community side.” 
The last step in the agreement was financial support from DWAF. This 
came in the form of a R42 million subsidy for low income users  for 
three years. The subsidy is intended as a transition measure to allow 
the municipality sufficient time to increase payment rates, fix leaks, and 
decrease illegal connections. The R42 million is allocated in decreasing 
tranches - R21 million for year one, R14 million for year two, and R7 
million for year three (Duvel, interview).
The financial support from DWAF was to be complemented by a direct 
contribution from the municipalities. As part of a strategy of redress, every 
historically disadvantaged municipality receives a grant from national gov-
ernment, called the equitable share. The equitable share is intended to help 
municipalities which have a low tax base to build up their infrastructure. 
Under the terms of the Odi agreement, each of the municipalities was to 
contribute 20% of their annual equitable share to the PUP.  The ‘carrot’ 
for these municipalities was that they would receive training from Rand 
Water Board so that after the three-year term of the contract they will be 
able to maintain and operate the system, and accrue the revenue in their 
own coffers. 
The backing of Samwu for this initiative was ensured in two ways. 
First, the jobs of all workers were guaranteed. Most of these were former 
employees of the North West Water Service Agency. Under the scheme 
they will be seconded to the Rand Water Board for three years. After that 
they will become employees of the Eastern District Councils. 
At the time of signing there was a distinct note of optimism amongst 
the key parties. Korbie Mare, operation engineer at Rand Water Board was 
emphatic that such arrangements were necessary to keep the public sector 
alive and produce high quality service: “We feel quite confident that at the 
end of the day we can leave behind people that can do the best anyone 
could have done.”
He emphasised that the private sector option would have been the 
disastrous for municipal capacity: “A private company would not be will-
ing to go into a three year agreement and then withdraw. It would typically 
go for a thirty year agreement by which time the local government would 
have lost all capacity to deliver.” 
Lance Veotte, National Water Co-ordinator of Samwu, offered a simi-
larly upbeat perspective from the standpoint of the union saying that 
the PUP “fits perfectly with our vision of building the capacity of disad-
vantaged municipalities so that they can deliver good quality, affordable 
services to the people instead of throwing in the towel to a multinational 
company.” 
Outcomes of the PUP
In this section of the report we examine the first year’s experience of the Odi PUP and look at outcomes under three subheadings: finance; building the partnership; and capacity-building.
Finance
Predictably the most difficult aspect of the PUP has been the finance. 
Discussions with nearly all people involved in the partnership focused 
on two shortcomings: low rates of payment for service in certain areas 
and the lack of equitable share contribution from the municipalities. The 
financial shortfall is underpinned by the fact that in a number of areas, 
illegal connections continue apace. According to Rowen Duvel of Rand 
Water Board, collection rates are a mere 2-4% in the peri-urban  Eastern 
District Council areas. In areas like Klipgat a metre is a rare exception, 
illegal yard taps and non-functioning communal standpipes are the norm. 
As community leader Nellie Ngwana put it, “the community is drinking 
water, but they are not paying for it.”
In the townships higher payment rates have been achieved. Although 
estimates of success rates vary, those who hold financial responsibility in 
Rand Water Board generally comment favourably. Rowen Duvel character-
ises efforts to get people to pay as “very successful”. Odi Retail marketing 
manager Zambi Modise argues that other municipalities are interested 
in Rand Water Board’s service because of their positive results in cost 
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picture. In Winterveld payment rates are 55-60%, in Mabopane with a 
large number of pensioners, it is about 45%.
But it is not only individual users who are reticent to part with their 
money. The municipalities which agreed to contribute 20% of their equi-
table share have not added a cent to the coffers. The reasons for this failure 
are complex. For the Town Clerk of Winterveld, Mr Willie Mogaladi, the 
issue is primarily one of political participation, “We the administration 
were not involved in drawing up the agreement, we were only called to 
sign it.” But like Rowen Duvel, Mogaladi pointed to the wide variety of 
needs of communities like Winterveld.  
While recognising that the municipalities are legally bound to pay 
their 20%, Duvel acknowledges that these impoverished communities are 
in a bind: the total equitable share for all of Odi is only R11 million, 
“That is not a lot of money for a municipality with such diverse needs. 
I can understand why they are reluctant to pay.” He also noted that 
Odi’s  impoverished municipalities may see Rand Water Board as a well-
resourced company, not deserving of a contribution.
To date only minimal pressure has been brought to bear on the munici-
palities for their refusal to abide by the agreement. Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand 
Water Board said that a letter had been sent to the relevant municipalities 
requesting payment. Nene Solomon, PRO for Rand Water’s local wing, Odi 
Retail, said in October 2000 that recently their offices had begun sending 
“indigent” consumers to the councils. The consumers were expected to ask 
the councils to pay Odi Retail on their behalf. 
But while the issue of non-payment of equitable share seems to draw 
minimal attention, pressure on individual households is systematic. Zambi 
Modise, Marketing Manager at Odi Retail, devotes much of his time 
to developing strategies around payment. Odi Retail has circulated pam-
phlets, they have called dozens of community meetings, they have held 
competitions for those who pay their arrears. But they have combined the 
carrots with the stick of water cutoffs. This strategy has brought some results 
but not total co-operation.  
The strongest resistance remains in the peri-urban areas like Klipgate 
where unemployment is more rife and access to resources more difficult. 
The Klipgat community comprises three sections, A, B, and C. In B and 
C the Project Steering Committees have taken a conscious decision not to 
pay. According to PSC Member Ngwana the community was willing to pay 
R10 per month for water but Rand Water Board was asking for R35. The 
negotiations broke off, and from mid-July, 2000, water service to Klipgat 
was on a “one day wet, one day dry” basis. Modise said that if payment did 
not improve, there would be a total cutoff. 
The issue of payment may ultimately drive a wedge between com-
munity members. Leaders such as Mashiane and Ngwana are adamant that 
the people must pay according to use. Samwu’s Hlongwane, who is also 
an active Klipgat resident concurred, “We understand their [Rand Water 
Board’s] frustration.”  Edwin Mahloma, Chair of the Samwu shop steward’s 
council and a staff member of Odi Retail, echoed these views on behalf of 
the union: “Workers realise it is important for people to pay for services.”
Yet, the elected leaders of the PSCs have taken a stand against payment. 
Similar divisions appear within Samwu as well. At its regional Congress 
in July, 2000, Samwu took a resolution that their members must set an 
example by paying.  Moreover, union leaders admit that their very own 
members double as ‘midnight plumbers’—installing illegal connections for 
R400 to R650 each. Even Duvel, who argues that Rand Water Board is not a 
‘soft option’ for users in terms of payment, admits that an illegal connection 
is a “good investment….For R500 you can get free water for life.” 
Two more issues confound the payment problems. Firstly, those who 
already have illegal connections must pay a fee to be brought into the 
legal loop. At roughly R1000 with a compulsory deposit of R360 there is 
considerable incentive to remain outside the system.  Lastly, there is the 
problem of the structure of Rand Water. Odi Retail is an arm of Rand Water 
Board which buys bulk water to service Odi. Odi Retail must pay Rand 
Water Board for its water. As Modise puts it, “we are regarded like any 
other customer in their finance department.” Odi Retail claims to be losing 
up to R2 million per month due to non-payment. 
While there is no easy solution to these problems, in the course of 
interviews, two very different proposals emerged. From Odi Retail the 
dream was apparently prepaid metres. Modise noted that there were two 
villages where prepaid metres were installed: Magaliespruit and Erasmus. 
He said that the former had a 100% payment rate and the latter 67%. His 
conclusion was, “if one or two villages can do it, why not the others?”. 
In the interim, the measure adopted by Odi Retail has been shared 
consumption billing. Under this approach the total amount of water used 
by a community is divided by the number of households. Each household 
then pays the same fraction of the total water cost. 
Predictably, shared consumption billing is likely to cause dissatisfaction. 
Two issues undermine its success. First, in many areas considerable water 




Poised to Succeed or Set Up to Fail?
bear the cost of such inefficiencies in a system they did not create. The 
more obvious issue is that of unequal usage. Certain households may 
consume lots of water due to the presence of lodgers, backyard shacks or 
involvement in water-intensive activities like agriculture. By contrast, under 
shared consumption billing small households which are water conscious 
will pay the same amount per month. In the end, this billing structure flies 
in the face of the notions of being “water wise” which Rand Water Board 
is trying to promote. In a meeting with Klipgat community leaders, all were 
adamant that “we want metres.”
But while Rand Water Board primarily focused on technical and educa-
tional aspects of financial control, Ngwana and Mashiane had an entirely 
different orientation. Both of them lamented the lack of expansion of 
infrastructure in Klipgat. According to Mashiane virtually no new pipes had 
been added in Klipgat A or B since 1994 and what existed was “far from 
the RDP standard.” Their suggestion was that Odi Retail use the laying of 
pipes as a way to create jobs. Ngwana suggested that Odi Retail bring 
the pipes and the community members will be paid to lay the pipes. Piet 
Hlongwane, Samwu organiser at Odi agreed with the proposal, “if they 
directly take part, they will take responsibility.”
While Rand Water Board and community leaders had different ideas 
about how to ensure community “buy in” to the PUP, there was agreement 
on a key financial issue: the need for greater capital expenditure to make 
the project sustainable. Rand Water Board Financial Manager Johan Louw 
estimated that R20 to 30 million of capital investment was needed to 
make the system operational. This would include extended bulk delivery, 
upgrading of illegal connections to legal connections and installation of 
household metres. “Then, and only then”, he argued, “can you apply credit 
control.”
The last issue concerning finance is the notion of indigents. The DWAF 
subsidy and the contributions of equitable share from the municipalities 
were intended to target poor households or ‘indigents’. The problem is 
that municipalities have no clear guidelines for determining or testing 
indigent status. Mr Mogaladi linked the refusal of Winterveld to pay their 
equitable share money to the lack of clarity around who was entitled to be 
subsidised: “Let the Rand Water Board indicate to me how many indigents 
there are.” This situation was also reflected in comments by Klipgat com-
munity leaders. They stated that when community members had inquired 
about accessing the equitable share to help pay for services, they were told 
that the money was there but could not be released because the council 
had no policy to define an indigent.
Zambi Modise noted that while most of Odi has not yet developed an 
indigent policy, Ga-Rankuwa made use of social welfare people to develop 
such a policy. According to Modise, in Ga-Rankuwa the first 10 kilolitres 
of water per month are free for those designated as indigent. At the time 
of the interview, only 50 consumers had qualified as indigents in Ga-
Rankuwa. Hence, while technically there is a lifeline of free water for 
those who cannot afford to pay, in practice this is not the case. Virtually 
every household is compelled to pay at least the minimum monthly service 
charge of R8,32 plus a charge of R2,05 per kilolitre for the first six kilolitres 
and R3,40 for the next fourteen kilolitres. For those households which use 
more than 20 kilolitres per month the extra usage would incur a tariff of 
R5,29 per kilolitre (Odi Retail 2000). 
Across communities in South Africa, the issue of payment for services 
has become highly contested. It is not surprising that even with the 
country’s only operating PUP, Odi has not been able to avoid this vexing 
problem. We shall return to this issue in more detail in the concluding 
section of the report. 
Building the Partnership
The Odi partnership between national and local government, a water 
parastatal and democratic labour and community structures was founded 
on points of common interest. The need to deliver water and build capacity 
at the municipal level while protecting current jobs and investment brought 
the partners to the negotiating table and created enough trust and political 
will to forge an agreement. After one year this spirit of optimism and co-
operation still predominates. Yet it has not all been smooth sailing. 
Since  September 1999 a number of events have occurred which have 
rocked the foundation of trust upon which the PUP was built. From the 
standpoint of the union one of the most important of these was Rand 
Water Board’s signing of a pact with French water multinational Vivendi 
(formerly Bureau des Eaux). The purpose of the agreement was to tender for 
Johannesburg’s water contract (which it did not win). According to Rowen 
Duvel, the relationship with Vivendi will not impact on the Odi arrange-
ment. Sam Shabalala argued that Rand Water Board formed the partnership 
in order to ensure some public sector involvement in Johannesburg water 
delivery. He pointed out the terms of reference for the tender made it impos-
sible for a company without international experience to make a submission. 
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as a betrayal. Speaking at the August National Congress of the union, 
Deputy Secretary Tom Ngobeni, one of the PUP’s strongest advocates, 
denounced Rand Water Board for “stabbing the union in the back” by 
signing an agreement with Vivendi without the knowledge of Samwu. 
While in a technical sense, Duvel may be correct that Rand Water 
Board’s partnership with Vivendi may have no bearing on Odi, the alliance 
puts Samwu in a difficult corner. For while the union may be praising Rand 
Water Board in Odi, just over an hour’s drive away, the same company 
entered a tendering process with a major international private sector water 
provider very unsympathetic to public sector initiatives. 
But the politics of the PUP have yet another dimension of complexity.  
In the original agreement the Ga-Rankuwa municipality was intended to 
be a signatory. At the time, their absence from the September 1999 accord 
seemed to be more of a bureaucratic snag than a political intention. But 
ten months later, Ga-Rankuwa went its own way. The municipality signed 
an agreement directly with Rand Water Board separate from the general 
Odi document. 
The separation of Ga-Rankuwa has some crucial implications for the 
viability of the Odi PUP. To begin with, the agreement is for only one year 
instead of the three years for Odi. The short-term nature of the contract 
has some major labour implications. First, the workers in Ga-Rankuwa 
municipality are not organised by Samwu. Therefore, any pressure from the 
union to get Ga-Rankuwa to fall in line will fall on deaf ears. To make 
matters worse, some of the workforce at Odi Retail is dedicated to working 
on Ga-Rankuwa matters. According to the agreement, all of the tasks now 
being done by Odi Retail for Ga-Rankuwa will be handed over to the 
municipality after a year. This could lead to two problems. First, rather than 
continuing with present arrangements, Ga-Rankuwa may elect to outsource 
some functions presently performed by the municipality. Such outsourcing 
could create a situation whereby private sector service providers may 
attempt to undercut the present bargaining council conditions of service 
and even extend them into other municipalities in Odi. 
A further hiccup could come within Odi Retail itself. If Ga-Rankuwa 
actually takes over responsibilities from Odi Retail in one year, workers 
in Odi Retail who previously helped to service Ga-Rankuwa will either 
be either idle or underutilised. As Piet Hlongwane of Samwu expressed it: 
“Our members will not have much to do after twelve months.” This will 
create pressure on the company to retrench. 
But the labour playing field, and indeed the whole arena, becomes even 
more complicated by the new demarcations. Under the municipal restruc-
turing, the municipalities of Ga-Rankuwa, Mabopane, and Winterveld will 
fall under Tshwane (formerly Pretoria) Metro. The Eastern District Council 
areas will go to Rustenburg.  Out of this process more questions will 
emanate. Duvel is confident that Tshwane will agree to continue the Odi 
agreement as is, but the union is more sceptical, especially with regard to 
job retention. This view was reiterated by Hanus Neetlhing, spokesperson 
for the Tshwane Metropolitan Council.  
Workers at Odi Retail also indicated a concern about their future under 
Tshwane.  Samwu’s Mahloma was concerned that the PUP may be seen 
as a financial liability: “What will Pretoria Metro say about losses incurred 
by Odi Retail?”. Mirriam Motlhamme, chair of the Samwu Women’s Forum, 
was also unsettled about the changes: “We need clear answers. I don’t 
think workers and the union have been properly informed.”
But the problem may not be Tshwane.  Ideally, the resources of the 
Metro could have provided the basis for cross-subsidising the Eastern 
District Council areas. However, with these poorest areas of Odi going to 
the small, less-resourced Rustenburg, the likelihood of any relief for those 
ninety-plus per cent people who are not paying is unlikely. The future may 
be a lot more experience of “one day wet, one day dry.” 
Capacity-Building
The key to the handover within the three year period was the building 
of municipal capacity to operate the system. From the standpoint of Rand 
Water, this capacity building needed to take place at three levels. Firstly, 
there was the need for formal education to conscientise councillors and 
local authority management about water issues. A number of educational 
events have pushed this process ahead. Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand Water 
Board noted the success in the course of the  year: “ I can see a huge 
difference in the way people think about water… Councillors are challeng-
ing us.” Mr Mogaladi of Winterveld TRC echoed the views of Ferreira, 
indicating that councillors had been given extensive workshopping. This 
education included a visit to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project to 
familiarise participants with the entirety of the water system. 
A less formal but equally vital form of education has been the attempts 
to promote a “water wise” type of thinking amongst the community. This 
informal programme has included a number of public events and competi-
tions designed to both build relations between the water service provider 
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Ferreira put it, “why you have to pay for water.” Their biggest event was the 
Day of Excellence held on 16 June, 2000, for youth. This activity included 
many competitions and recreational activities. 
The third prong of the capacity building is the hands-on skills training 
for local government officials who have to actually perform the admin-
istrative and technical tasks of running the system on a day-to- day 
basis. This aspect of the capacity building has been slow to take off. Mr 
Mogaladi highlighted that in Winterveld “people in offices” are not getting 
training. While noting that R300 000 had been allocated to training, in 
his assessment it was going to the wrong people. “Maybe what we should 
fight for is for the whole R300 000 to be spent on officials.“ Mahloma 
echoed these views: “Why capacitate people who may not be there after 
election?”.  Patrick Ntsime of DWAF indicated that the department was 
in the process of mobilising funding support for such programmes but by 
September 2000 no formal training sessions or workshops had apparently 
been held. 
Critical Analysis
A year ago there was undiluted optimism from within Rand Water, Samwu and other constituencies for the Odi PUP. But a year’s experience has prompted considerable reflection. On the posi-tive side, nearly everyone interviewed expressed a certain pride 
in the achievement of the PUP. The comments of S.C. Vogel, regional 
director for DWAF in the North West were typical: “I am personally very 
happy with the way the agreement went.”  Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand Water 
Board called it a “great success” stating that such PUPs amounted to acting 
in the “public interest”. She welcomed the impending proposal to set up 
a PUP in Harrismith. 
From the union side, Odi was mentioned frequently at the Samwu 
Congress in August, 2000, with one delegate calling for more extensive 
publicity of this public sector delivery success story. But while participating 
organisations in the PUP remain upbeat, implementation has proven far 
more difficult than anticipated. Here we will look at a number of key issues 
which have impacted and will continue to impact on the Odi initiative and 
other possible PUPs.
Finance 
The most important issue for the PUP is finance. As noted earlier, there 
are many dimensions to the financial problem.  However, nearly everyone 
we spoke to about the problem focused attention on non-payment by 
users and unauthorised connections. To the credit of Rand Water Board 
they have made considerable efforts to consult with communities over the 
issue of payment. Apart from improving their billing system, they have 
also embarked on a number of creative strategies to encourage people 
to pay, including a lottery draw with prizes for people who pay their 
bills. But nonetheless, as in peri-urban and rural areas across South Africa 
response to such calls has been minimal. Considered in a narrow financial 
framework, Odi Retail has amassed a debt of some R14 million since the 
contract was signed. This debt is a cumulative figure based on unaccounted 
for water as well as water used but not paid for. 
Indeed, from the perspective of Samwu, Rand Water Board and DWAF, 
the issue of non-payment loomed central. As Sam Shabalala of rand Water 
Board put it, “it is threatening to make all of our hard work come to 
naught.” 
Yet scratching a bit deeper, the problem of non-payment takes on a 
slightly different hue. For example, each of the municipalities which are 
party to the Odi agreement were supposed to contribute 20% of their 
equitable share, yet none have done so. When asked what steps were 
taken to force these municipalities into adhering to the agreement, DWAF 
Assistant Director Patrick Ntsime, pointed to the reduction of water pres-
sure to communities. While this might affect the municipalities through 
dissatisfaction amongst it citizens, as a policy to deal with non-payment of 
equitable share it would appear misdirected. So a first step in looking at the 
financial picture would be to avoid the path of least resistance: blaming the 
poor who are unable to pay or who have not been able to wend their way 
through the bureaucracy to be declared indigent. 
A more nuanced view of the financial aspects must also look at the 
overall context of local government budgets. With plummeting intergovern-
mental grants and a lack of capital investment, there simply are not enough 
resources available to make providing water service to every household 
in poor areas like Odi a financially viable project. As Rowen Duvel put 
it, “we need money for infrastructure.” Traditional leader Piet Mashiane 
as well as DWAF Assistant Director Ntsime recognised this factor as 
well. Ntsime indicated that DWAF was looking at ways of accessing 
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enhance infrastructure. This could be a step in the right direction but could 
ultimately plunge already cash-strapped municipalities into further debt. 
Indeed Rand Water’s Johan Louw was extremely sceptical about the DBSA 
option. He was convinced that Odi would not qualify for any DBSA loan 
until its balance sheet looked far more favourable. 
Ultimately the question emerges as to whether self-sustaining municipal 
water service in under-resourced communities is a realisable goal. While a 
number of important measures can be taken to reduce costs (reduction of 
leaks, cutting back on illegal connections) without an external subsidy from 
other government sources, water cutoffs are likely to remain a feature of the 
peri-urban and rural life in Odi. 
The RDP vision of a free 50 litres per capita per day, supported  by 
Samwu and the Rural Development Services Network,  may remain the 
only truly viable approach to  water for poor communities. Clearly provid-
ing this level of lifeline, even with block tariffs, will not recover costs in 
the short or long term. Ultimately the issue of financing water service boils 
down to whether water is seen as a commodity where costs are to be fully 
recovered or a basic developmental need and socio-economic right which 
should be subsidised. 
If there is one noticeable shift in the thinking about finance amongst 
the stakeholders of this PUP, it is the increased emphasis on cost recovery 
and financial sustainability. At the time of the signing of the agreement, the 
dominant thinking was the key to increasing payment was simply increas-
ing a sense of ‘ownership’ of the project. This approach to the partnership 
was evident in the discourse of role players in events like the Samwu 
Workshop conducted by ILRIG in 1999 (Samwu 1999).  
But by September 2000 representatives from government, Rand Water 
Board, labour and the community were tending to cite moves like “attack-
ing the culture of non-payment” as key to the project’s future success. 
While such a change is understandable given the increasing fiscal pressures 
on all parties involved, there is a tendency in this approach to de-link the 
PUP’s financial problems from government economic policy. To the extent 
that this de-linking continues, key decision-makers in the partnership may 
run the risk of destroying the political goodwill they have created with 
communities whose history warrants a healthy suspicion of any structures 
with power or money. 
If this goodwill is undermined, the success of the PUP will then be 
assessed via a narrow cost benefit analysis, generally associated with 
increasing cutoffs and servicing only those who can afford to pay. Such 
an evolution of the PUP would make its actions and rationale difficult 
to distinguish from those of the option it was set up to fight: the public-
private partnership. While there remains a considerable amount of political 
will to avoid such a path, especially within Samwu and many officials of 
Rand Water, in an era where neoliberal, free market thinking is dominant, 
there is a constant need to review and recharge political batteries to avoid 
backsliding into the dominant paradigm. 
Labour’s Role
Samwu played a leading role in pulling the Odi PUP together. Because 
of their unique position at a nexus between service delivery, the policy-
making process and having historical ties to democratic structures in the 
community, the union was able to facilitate bringing all parties to the table. 
This move by Samwu took place at an historical moment where all the 
role players in the Odi PUP were looking for solutions and shared enough 
common ground to forge an alliance. 
A year later Samwu’s centrality to the initiative may be less clear-cut. 
While the union was an able catalyst for negotiating the partnership, 
Samwu may be pushed into a situation where they have to straddle a fence 
between irreconcilable interests. This potential dilemma revolves around 
the issue of payment for services. Officially the union’s view is that people 
should be entitled to a free lifeline of 50 litres per day per person. Yet, 
at the same time, Samwu is promoting a position of payment for services 
in Odi. This is creating possible conflicts of interest both within the union 
itself and between the union and the community. Traditional leader Piet 
Mashiane summed up this tension most aptly: “Samwu members won’t 
close their own taps.  Nor will it be easy for them to close the taps of their 
unemployed, impoverished neighbours.” 
The problem has another dimension as well - the linkage of payment 
to wages. As shop steward Edwin Mahloma noted: “If people don’t pay 
and Samwu puts a wage demand in front of them [management], they will 
just show us the books.”
But if the union’s strategic allies are the under-resourced communities 
of Odi, the union will have to confront the issue of financial support for 
water service. As noted earlier, there is a strong consensus from both Rand 
Water Board and government that Odi needs a capital injection to function 
effectively.  Yet in the context of a government policy which is intent 
on stepping up privatisation and cutting expenditure, such infrastructure 
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At some point, Samwu may have to make a difficult choice if Odi is to 
survive as a PUP. The union may have to either mobilise a campaign for 
lifelines and infrastructure investment from the state or step up the pressure 
on citizens to pay for services. 
This test of Samwu’s commitment to social movement unionism (rather 
than simply protecting members’ jobs) could be crucial not only for the 
position of the union, but may ultimately decide whether the PUP becomes 
a developmental option or simply a sophisticated stakeholder structure to 
promote cost recovery. 
But perhaps there is even a need to question the limits of the PUP. 
Within the union some people have expressed concern that a public-public 
partnership may not be the appropriate form for a public sector alternative. 
Rather than embodying a form of “co-operative government”, there have 
been suggestions from some within Samwu that a PUP creates a structure 
where parties remain at arm’s length from one another. This view would 
argue that a “public-public partnership” by its very nature may be a gentle 
form of a business arrangement, but a business arrangement nonetheless. 
Hence, in assessing the PUP as an alternative, perhaps the question needs 
to be asked: Can a public-public partnership be structured in a way to help 
build a public sector based on principles like collectivity and solidarity?
Government Commitment
The changing discourse from DWAF culminating in a June 2000 pro-
posal  by Minister Ronnie Kasrils to amend the Water Services Act in order 
to facilitate private sector entry into water service, shows that while the 
government has promoted and supported the PUP, their heart may not 
be in these sorts of agreement for long (DWAF 2000).  Patrick Ntsime, 
Assistant Director of DWAF, summed up the Department’s position: “I 
suspect we will be moving to a private sector model but it’s taking too 
much time…do you keep paying subsidies and get nothing in return? …I 
am against privatisation but I am for private sector involvement.”
Indeed there are more than just these comments to indicate that PUPs 
are not the favoured option. Jo-Anne Ferreira of Rand indicated that her 
“biggest letdown” about the Odi agreement was government hesitating 
support. In her view the Department of Water Affairs “is stepping away 
from the project …in a situation where we cannot afford it.”
Perhaps the ultimate test of DWAF’s commitment to the PUP can be 
found in its financial pledges. In this regard, the government’s actions 
are severely wanting. In terms of DWAF’s subsidy to Rand Water, there 
has been a rapid decline over the three year period from R32 million 
in 1997 to just under 17 million for fiscal year 2001/2. In theory, the 
equitable share is supposed to be filling in the gaps but as noted above, the 
municipalities have not made any contributions of this funding.
Another indicator of DWAF’s financial stance on water is the question 
of mobilising investment for the PUP.  Rand Water Board sources as well as 
Ntsime acknowledged that infrastructure investment was a necessity if Odi 
was to succeed. Yet, Ntsime’s main proposal for raising capital was a DBSA 
loan. This suggestion was immediately dismissed by Louw who pointed 
out that the balance sheet of Odi due to non-payment would make the 
PUP a bad risk for a lender. But if the PUP were viewed as an important 
policy measure in the government’s water service delivery strategy, clearly 
the money could be found. When Kasrils was at the Ministry of Defence, 
he aggressively justified extra-budgetary process funding for 100 times the 
amount required in Odi to beef up the nation’s defence force. Surely that 
same amount of political will could deliver a few pipes and metres to an 
historically oppressed area whose people played such a powerful role in 
overthrowing the apartheid regime. 
At this stage the failure to deliver such a relatively small stipend to this 
PUP must raise the question of whether the PUP is being set up to collapse 
in order to put the final nail in the coffin of the public sector option. 
Gender
As noted in the opening sections of this paper, water is an intensely 
gendered service. This gender imbalance was noted by Samwu in their 
1998 “Vision for Water Provision”.  As the union put it: “Water services in 
South Africa are male dominated.”  Yet for the most part this does not seem 
to have been factored into the Odi process.  In times of water shortage, in 
places like Odi where traditional rural gender divisions of labour generally 
apply, the burden on women increases. At the household level within Odi, 
the pressure to pay for services and for arrears has placed more pressure 
on women. While the Odi PUP has succeeded in building a political 
partnership the outcomes are far less clear when it comes to actually 
increasing water getting to the household level and thereby lightening the 
load upon women.
But if accessing water is ‘women’s work’ in the domestic sphere, in 
the political sphere the issue remains largely in the hands of men. Nearly 
every government official in a position of responsibility for this project is a 
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decision-making structures of Odi. 
There is a definite disjuncture between the responsibility women have 
for water at the domestic level and the power they enjoy in water’s political 
realm. While improving gender balance in decision-making around water 
may not immediately solve the dilemmas facing the PUP, there is an 
important political principle involved. The PUP was founded on the notion 
of democratic participation and the defining of basic needs as socio-
economic rights. Gender redress, therefore, while not a stated goal of the 
PUP is an advance not only if the partnership wants to deliver but if it wants 
to live up to its goals of promoting democratic participation. 
Conclusion
As one moves along the revamped main road leading from Tsh-wane to Odi, newly erected billboards for the Morula Sun appear repeatedly. The slogan on the signs reads: “Helping to build the road to riches.” The arrogant irony of this phrase, 
appearing amidst communities where a job and a regular supply of water 
often constitute distant dreams, reminds us that so little has changed in the 
poorest parts of South Africa - the former homelands. 
For the citizens of Odi, a public-public partnership was never meant 
to deliver riches. But the Odi public-public partnership was an important 
advance in South Africa’s water service delivery. Largely sparked by pres-
sure from labour, the PUP came together in a spirit that promoted a 
mission of redress and development by the public sector and embodied a 
genuine attempt to empower disadvantaged communities and municipali-
ties to drive a process of people-centred development. The partnership has 
continued its sterling success at the level of building alliances between 
government and civil society including labour. Yet these successes, as Sam 
Shabalala has pointed out may “all come to naught” if sufficient funding 
is not made available. 
After a year Odi is teetering on the brink?  If Odi should collapse, the 
failure cannot be ascribed to a lack of political will on the part of Samwu, 
Rand Water, or the community. Hours and hours of meetings and the forma-
tion of Project Steering Committees are concrete evidence of the requisite 
political will. Even more certainly, any failure of the PUP should not be 
attributed to the “culture of non-payment” by impoverished citizens. 
Rather, the viability of Odi revolves around the commitment by national 
government to their “preferred option” - a model that will ensure that 
impoverished municipalities have access to the resources for development. 
As long as the gods of fiscal discipline and deficit reduction continue 
to reign, there will be a “culture of non-payment”, not in the informal 
settlements of Odi but in the highest echelons of government. To break this 
culture of non-payment and revive the Odi PUP may require more than 
a few meetings and legalistic refinements of the partnership. Indeed the 
future of the Odi PUP may rest with the capacity of  Samwu and its allies to 
mobilise sufficient forces to make it impossible for government to allow the 
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Endnotes
1 All quotes from role players in the Odi Public-Public Partnerships are 
from personal interviews conducted by the author unless otherwise indi-
cated. A list of all interviews appears in the list of references. 
2 The International Resource and Information Group (ILRIG), by whom the 
author is employed, has done extensive workplace research of this nature 
and this experience has made us acutely aware of the centrality of gaining 
union co-operation not only in accessing workers but in assuring they 
will speak without fear of recrimination from management.  It should 
also be noted that ILRIG has a long history of working with Samwu, 
including a contract (1997-99) to provide research support to the union’s 
Anti-Privatisation campaign and delivering a number of workshops in 
conjunction with Samwu’s education department. 
3 At the time of writing, Manqele had won a victory in the first round of her 
case but judgment had been reserved by the Constitutional Court. 
4 Unless otherwise indicated demographic information on Odi comes from 
Woolridge (2000).
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